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This paper attempts to quantify the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on social capital 
with cross-country data. Using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), the author 
estimates reduced-form regressions of the main determinants of social capital controlling 
for HIV prevalence, institutional quality, social distance and economic indicators. The 
results obtained indicate that HIV prevalence affects social capital negatively. The 
empirical estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in HIV prevalence 
will lead to a 1 percent decline in trust, controlling for other determinants of social 
capital. If one moves from a country with a relatively low level of HIV prevalence such as 
Estonia to a country with a high level such as Zimbabwe, one would observe an 
approximate 8% decline in social capital. These results are robust in a number of 
dimensions and highlight the empirical importance of an additional mechanism through 
which HIV/AIDS hinders the development process.  
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The Social Development department of the World Bank states that the concept of 
social capital “…refers to the norms and networks that enable collective action
1”. 
Although the concept of social capital is frequently used in rather vague ways in a large 
part of the social sciences literature, the basic idea is generally that elements such as trust, 
social norms and social networks make groups or organizations work more efficiently.  
The same World Bank department also claims that “Increasing evidence shows 
that social cohesion — social capital — is critical for poverty alleviation and sustainable 
human and economic development”. In fact, there have been a growing number of efforts 
attempting to quantify the influence of social capital on economic development, as we 
discuss in the main text. Furthermore, several authors have linked the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic to social capital (see for instance Gaffeo, 2003), usually pointing out how 
factors related to the disease such as stigma,  discrimination and the costs posed by care 
for the sick as well as orphans erode and put pressure on social capital.  
The objective of this paper is to attempt to quantify the impact of the epidemic on 
social capital using cross-country data. For this purpose, we will estimate reduced form 
regressions of the main determinants, as identified in the literature, of social capital, using 
national levels of trust from the World Values Survey (WVS) as a proxy for social 
capital. To our knowledge there have been no previous efforts to evaluate this empirical 
question. 
With this objective in mind, we will briefly discuss in the first two sections the 
links previously identified in the literature between social capital, development and 
HIV/AIDS. Subsequently, we will present the data used for the cross-country regressions, 
which are described in detail in Appendix A. The fourth section addresses the results 
obtained from the estimation exercises for a sample including both developing countries 
and industrial economies. The fifth section presents additional regressions that aim to 
assess the robustness of the results obtained.  
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The links between social capital and development 
When one goes through the literature on social capital it is easy to identify three 
key components in most definitions of the concept: trust, social networks and social 
norms. Those elements form the foundation of the mechanisms through which social 
capital reduces uncertainty and transaction costs, discourages opportunistic behavior, 
fosters cooperation and increases the efficiency of markets and organizations, thus 
affecting economic development. Routledge and von Amsberg (2003), for instance, 
present a theoretical model where social capital affects economic growth by facilitating 
cooperative trade. 
Formalizing the ideas previously outlined, an influential paper by Zak and Knack 
(2001) presents a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and moral hazard 
to determine how trust varies across societies. They show that trust depends on the social, 
economic and institutional (formal and informal) context in which transactions occur. In 
particular, social heterogeneity and the quality of institutions to punish cheaters affect 
trust levels, with homogeneous and egalitarian societies showing higher trust. In their set-
up, trust enhances growth by reducing the costs of transactions. Moreover, societies can 
get stuck in low-trust poverty traps. 
As far as the empirical evidence on the link between social capital and 
development is concerned, Knack and Keefer (1997) using cross-country data find that 
trust and civic norms are significantly related to economic growth and investment. Knack 
(2002) finds that social trust leads to better governance. Zak and Knack (2001) test 
empirically the predictions of their model described above by extending the Knack and 
Keefer sample using later waves of the WVS that includes a number of developing 
countries. They corroborate the conclusion that trust affects economic growth. 
Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) perform a robustness analysis of the relationship between trust 
and economic growth and conclude that the Zak and Knack results are highly robust in 
terms of statistical significance of the estimated coefficients and reasonably robust in 
terms size of the estimated effects.  
Another strand of the literature links link social capital with financial 
development, as it identifies high levels of trust as one of the main determinants of 
financial depth. Guiso et al. (2004) measure social capital through blood donation and   4
electoral participation and conclude that this variable is significant in explaining financial 
development. Nonetheless, as argued by Sabatini (2006), indicators such as blood 
donation and electoral participation are arguably outcomes of social capital rather than a 
measure of social capital itself. Furthermore, Garretsen et al. (2004) also show that 
societal norms and culture help to explain differences in cross-country financial 
development. Their indicators for social norms are obtained from survey data about the 
values of people working in local subsidiaries of IBM in more than 50 countries.  
Durlauf (2002) and Sabatini (2006) discuss in detail the extensive challenges 
present in the empirical analysis of social capital, in particular, flaws in studies linking 
social capital to economic growth. A number of the indicators commonly used are 
measures of outcomes of social capital rather than social capital itself. Others rely on 
subjective perceptions that depend on the economic, social and historical context of the 
individuals being surveyed. Moreover, technical econometric difficulties abound such as 
identification problems, reverse causality, measurement error, among others.  
 
Social capital and HIV/AIDS  
A number of links have been explored between HIV/AIDS and economic 
performance. In addition to the more evident impacts of the disease on mortality, labor 
productivity and on household savings due to increased health expenditures, HIV/AIDS 
contributes to the persistence of poverty as it affects not only the stock, but also the 
accumulation of human capital
2. Bell et al. (2004) calibrate an OLG model for South 
Africa taking into account the fact that when parents die orphans are threatened by 
financial distress and lack of care, which may lead to increases in the incidence of child 
labor and/or reduce school enrollment/attendance. They predict that family income could 
be up to 23,000 Rand lower by 2050 compared with the No-AIDS scenario. Bell et al. 
(2006) perform a similar exercise for Kenya and conclude that by 2040, GDP per adult 
will be 11% less than it would have been in the No-AIDS Scenario for that country. 
Furthermore, Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) examines the impact of the epidemic on 
fertility decisions in a panel of African countries and concludes that HIV/AIDS affects 
the total fertility rate positively and school enrollment rates negatively. This author 
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argues that those results are consistent with theoretical models of precautionary demand 
for children in a high mortality environment that predict that in this context parents will 
choose to have less children and provide each child with less education. Hence, 
HIV/AIDS would contribute to reverse the fertility transition and accumulation of human 
capital leading to significant long-run impacts on welfare.  
Moreover, the fact that social stigma and discrimination are frequently attached to 
HIV positive individuals, as pointed out by Gaffeo (2003) is of crucial importance for our 
objectives in this study. Zak and Knack (2001) show in their model described previously 
that discrimination lowers trust, hence there seems to be an indirect link between 
HIV/AIDS and development as the pandemic is possibly associated with increases in 
discrimination and through this channel to reduced economic performance.  
In addition, a number of authors argue that HIV/AIDS also poses a considerable 
burden on traditional networks and coping mechanisms to address economic shocks, in 
particular in what concerns care for orphans and sick individuals. Foster (2006) for 
instance, argues that governments have been slow to react to the orphan crisis in sub-
Saharan Africa that is intimately linked to the epidemic causing families and 
communities to in his words “shoulder most of the effort and costs”. This strain on social 
networks could lead to a negative impact on social capital or even to the disintegration of 
the existing mechanism to address shocks.  
Haacker (2004) posits that HIV/AIDS has an effect on social and economic 
institutions of a country, which in turn would affect economic development. He argues 
that the epidemic contributes to deteriorating security at the individual, community and 
national level, in particular as governments’ capacities are eroded leading to increased 
crime and instability. This author also states that the epidemic could increase the 
vulnerability of a country to civil war.  
Campbell et al. (2002) investigate a different causal relationship by focusing on 
the impact of social capital on health issues in a South African mining community, 
defining social capital in terms of people's membership of voluntary community or 
associations. They tested the hypothesis that organizational members were less likely to 
have HIV. They found mixed results that varied across age and gender.    6
Overall, one can conclude that HIV/AIDS is likely to have an impact on social 
capital through stigma and discrimination, through the burden it poses on traditional 
social networks that mitigate risks and through increased insecurity. The question that we 
will attempt to answer in subsequent sections is how large this effect is. This will allow 
one to assess the importance of this indirect channel through which HIV/AIDS affects the 
development process. 
 
Overview of the data 
The main dependent variable in our regressions is a measure of social capital 
obtained from cross-country data on national levels of trust from the World Values 
Survey (WVS)
3. Using a nationally representative sample, the WVS provides a measure 
of “trust” given by the percentage of the population who answer yes to the question: “In 
general, do you think that most people can be trusted?” against the alternative that “you 
can’t be too careful when dealing with people”. We use data from the latest waves of the 
survey, which includes 6 sub-Saharan African countries (only Nigeria and South Africa 
were available in previous surveys). All the countries included in this study are listed in 
Appendix B.  
Nonetheless, one has to acknowledge that this particular measure of social capital 
has been subject to a number of criticisms in the literature. The first one concerns the fact 
that it reflects individual perceptions of society and that one needs to take into account 
the social and historical context in which those perceptions are formed. Sabatini (2006) 
also argues that urban areas and better educated persons are usually overrepresented in 
the WVS. Another caveat concerning the survey question is that different respondents 
may have different interpretations of the question asked.  
An alternative aggregate measure of social capital was proposed by Temple 
(1998), who refers to a “social capability” index, which is an assessment of a “society’s 
suitability for institutional and economic development”. Nonetheless, this measure was 
constructed in the early 1960s and therefore would not be suitable for our purposes. The 
literature proposes several other empirical proxies for social capital (see Sabatini, 2006 
for a critical survey), including participation in voluntary associations, that are inadequate 
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for our objectives for a number of reasons, including, the fact that they are not widely 
available across countries and the fact that they are outcomes rather than indicators of 
social capital, among other shortcomings.  
We collected data on a number of determinants of trust that were identified and 
discussed in previous sections of this document. Those include HIV prevalence rates, 
governance indexes, measures of the quality of institutions (in particular regarding the 
control of corruption) and measures of social distance such as income inequality, ethnic 
and linguistic fractionalization. Moreover, following Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), we 
included measures of educational achievement as determinants of trust. Using individual 
level data for the United States those authors find that “successful people” in terms of 
income and educational achievement tend to trust more.  
Finally, we also included the log of initial GDP (as measured by Dollar and 
Kraay, 2002) as a possible determinant of trust in some specifications. In the Zak and 
Knack (2001) moral hazard model trust is decreasing with wealth, as investors have more 
incentives to monitor brokers’ behavior to protect their wealth, and increasing in wages
4.  
Following this logic, the impact of the log of initial GDP (the proxy for those two 
economic factors at the national level) on trust is ambiguous. We refer the reader to 
Appendix A for a more comprehensive description of data and sources.  
 
Preliminary empirical analysis 
There are a number of econometric difficulties that are likely to arise when one 
undertakes cross-country regressions of the determinants of national levels of social 
capital as proxied by trust, resulting in problems in terms of bias and consistency of 
estimates obtained. Indeed, it is certainly the case that several of the variables considered 
below suffer from measurement error problems. In particular, it is well-known that the 
quality of the data concerning HIV prevalence rates is rather poor. Although a number of 
recent Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) have collected more accurate and reliable 
data on prevalence rates, particularly in Africa, the cross-country availability of such data 
is very limited. In addition, our dependent variable (trust) was obtained from survey data 
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model, so if this cost is high, there are more incentives to trust the broker.   8
and the problematic aspects of such data were discussed in previous sections. Once again, 
data availability for a large number of countries precludes us from using more reliable 
measures.  
Moreover, omitted variables could present another serious potential problem. We 
tried to control for the different determinants of trust identified in the literature and 
present statistical tests to diagnose model misspecification in order to mitigate for the 
possibility that third factors are determining the relations obtained between HIV and 
social capital. Perhaps a more preoccupying possibility concerns the endogeneity of HIV 
prevalence rates to national levels of trust. We have attempted to mitigate this problem by 
ensuring that control variables are pre-determined i.e. we included values for periods 
before the WVS surveys took place, whenever possible. In addition, we will also present 
results from instrumental variables regressions in the next section, where HIV prevalence 
is instrumented by national circumcision rates. Finally, among other difficulties the 
presence of multiple regimes and non-linearities in the relationships studied is a clear 
possibility, particularly as the sample includes a number of so-called “transition” (former 
socialist) economies.  
Bearing those caveats in mind, Table 1 presents results from a number of 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions that consider the log of trust as the dependent 
variable, as specified in the expression below: 
i i i i HIV Trust ε γ β α + Υ + + =
/ ) log( ) log(  
where the first two terms on the right-hand-side refer to the constant and the log of HIV 
prevalence,  i Υ is a vector containing other explanatory variables of trust and  i ε  is a 
random error term. The coefficient β  measuring the effect of HIV prevalence on trust is 
of particular interest to us.  
Appendix C presents the correlation matrix between the regressors as well as a 
number of descriptive statistics. One should note that, with the possible exception of the 
variables measuring institutional quality, the correlations are not so high that they would 
impair obtaining estimates of separate impact of the regressors. When looking at the 10 
different specifications presented in Table 1 a number of interesting conclusions emerge.   9
One should note that HIV prevalence presents a negative and statistically significant (at 
conventional levels) impact on trust through most specifications
5.  
Specification (4), for instance, includes as explanatory variables: HIV prevalence, the 
rule of law index constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2006) and data on ethnic 
fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003). As expected, both the estimated coefficients 
for HIV prevalence and fractionalization present negative signs, although the later is not 
statistically significant
6, whereas the rule of law index presents a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. The results from this regression indicate that levels of trust are 
lower in countries with higher HIV prevalence. 
In addition, since the data is expressed in logarithmic form the coefficient estimates 
can be interpreted as elasticities, indicating how sensitive trust is to increases in HIV 
prevalence. This implies that a 1% increase in HIV prevalence would result in a 0.65% 
decrease in trust or a one standard deviation increase in prevalence will lead to nearly 2% 
decline in trust. Nonetheless, the diagnostic statistics suggest that the results obtained in 
this specification should be interpreted with caution, since the null hypothesis that the 
model is not misspecified is not rejected at the 1 percent level, but is rejected at the 5 
percent level. 
Specifications (8) through (10) regress trust on HIV prevalence, different measures of 
institutional quality, the Gini coefficient for income inequality as a proxy for social 
distance and the log of initial income
7. Diagnostic statistics for those regressions present 
more satisfactory results in terms of model specification, when compared to previous 
ones. As predicted by the theories discussed in previous sections, the Gini coefficient 
seems to affect trust negatively (i.e. greater income inequality reduces trust); whereas 
government effectiveness and control of corruption increase levels of trust (the 
coefficient for the rule of law index in specification (8) albeit positive is not statistically 
significant).  
                                                 
5 For specification (9) the impact is only significant at the 12% level, which may be acceptable given the 
small sample size.  
6 Zak and Knack (2001) also fail to find a statistically significant linear relationship between trust and 
ethnic heterogeneity, more on this topic in the next section. 
7 Specification (7) indicates that our measure of educational achievement presents a negative coefficient 
that is only significant at the 11 percent level in a regression also controlling for HIV prevalence, rule of 
law, and income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.   10
The HIV prevalence variable presents a negative coefficient varying in size from 
-0.327 in (9) to -0.369 in (10). As we have discussed previously, these figures can be 
interpreted as elasticities, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in HIV 
prevalence will lead to a one percent decline in trust, controlling for other determinants of 
social capital.  
Overall, we may infer that the regressions presented here suggest that the idea that 
HIV/AIDS has a statistically and economically significant deleterious effect on social 
capital has some empirical support. This is an additional channel through which the 
epidemic represents a constraint to development in some parts of the world, in particular 
for the African continent. One has to bear in mind that the findings are subject to a 
number of caveats, including the possibility that the estimates are subject to endogeneity 
bias. In the next section we will perform several experiments to assess whether there is a 
fundamental change in the conclusions obtained, when we vary the specifications along 
various dimensions.     11
Table 1 
HIV/AIDS and Social Capital OLS Estimates 
Dependent variable is generalized level of trust from WVS 
Control 
Variables: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
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N  79  78 78 78 76 75 64  72  72  72 
R-squared  0.068 0.267 0.289 0.290 0.303 0.340 0.395  0.355  0.371  0.352 
RESET 0.419  0.010  0.038  0.043 0.027 0.045 0.080 0.181 0.697  0.076 
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. N denotes 
the number of observations included (varies according to data availability). RESET refers to p-values for Ramsey’s RESET misspecification test: Ho is 
that the model is not misspecified. a) This coefficient is significant at the 11 percent level. b) This coefficient is significant at the 12 percent level.  12
Robustness of the results obtained 
As argued by Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), robustness is a multi-dimensional concept 
that cannot be analyzed using a single indicator. In this section, we will use the term 
“robustness” as referring to our attempt to assess whether the results obtained in the 
previous section are sensitive to changes in the explanatory variables used, to changes in 
the sample composition, and to the use of different econometric techniques. We will 
concentrate in particular on the statistical significance and size of the estimated effect of 
HIV prevalence on trust.  
The literature on the determinants of trust across countries, using a more limited 
set of countries and different fractionalization measures than ours, has presented a 
number of results indicating that trust might be a quadratic function of ethnic and 
linguistic homogeneity. Zak and Knack (2001) have argued that the rationale for these 
results is that in settings with a large number of small groups, no single group represents 
much of a threat to others; therefore the effective social distance is greatest at an 
intermediate range of the fractionalization measure.  
Specifications (11) and (12) control for HIV prevalence, rule of law, ethnic 
fractionalization and its squared value and linguistic fractionalization and its squared 
value respectively. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in the 
previous section. The fractionalization measures remain statistically not significant, but 
the rule of law variable and HIV prevalence coefficient are significant at the 1 percent 
level and present the expected signs. Nevertheless, one should note that the RESET test 
rejects the null of no omitted variables for those models.  
Subsequently, we limit the sample included in the regressions to developing 
countries exclusively, in order to check whether by considering only this sub-sample, one 
would observe changes in the results previously obtained. In fact, specifications (13) and 
(14) show that most regressors are no longer statistically significant; nonetheless HIV 
prevalence continues to present a negative and significant elasticity. The estimates 
indicate a 0.5% reduction in social capital for a 1% increase in HIV prevalence. The 
diagnostic statistics do not detect model misspecification, but results should be 
interpreted with caution given the small sample size (only 49 observations).    13
Furthermore, we attempt to account for the fact that HIV prevalence might be 
endogenous to social capital by instrumenting for this variable using national data for 
male circumcision rates obtained from WHO (2007) and Drain et al. (2006). The strategy 
of using circumcision rates as an instrument for HIV has been employed in a number of 
other papers for African countries, notably Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) and Werker et al. 
(2006), in the light of new medical evidence that male circumcision substantially reduces 
the risk of HIV transmission. Nevertheless, these studies were instrumenting for HIV 
using circumcision rates in the context of regressions for total fertility rates, school 
enrollment and economic growth, not social capital.  
Specifications (15) and (16) are two-stage-least-squares (TSLS) regressions of 
trust on HIV prevalence, measures of institutional quality (control of corruption and rule 
of law respectively) and the Gini coefficient, where HIV prevalence was instrumented by 
circumcision rates. All the explanatory variables are statistically significant and present 
the expected signs. The estimated elasticities for the instrumented HIV coefficient are -
0.447 and -0.376, which are of similar size to the ones obtained from OLS regressions in 
the previous section. Hence, our attempt to tackle the endogeneity issue does not 
substantially alter the conclusions already reached. Nevertheless, one should note the 
relatively high likelihood that circumcision rates are endogenous to national trust levels 
for religious or cultural reasons. Hence, circumcision rates could be an inadequate 
instrument in this case, as this variable may not be unrelated to trust.  
In addition, we follow a large strand of the literature on the impact of institutions 
on economic development by using the log of settler mortality as an instrument for 
institutional quality as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2001). Specification (17) is a TSLS 
regression of trust on HIV prevalence (instrumented by circumcision rates), control of 
corruption (instrumented by settler mortality) and the Gini coefficient. The coefficient 
estimates obtained for all controls variables have the expected signs and are of similar 
size when compared to the ones obtained in previous regressions. The Gini coefficient 
and the control of corruption variable are statistically significant at conventional levels, 
whereas HIV prevalence is not. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that these should 
be interpreted with care given the very small sample size (we only have data available for 
26 countries).   14
Finally, we check for effect of different proxies for the institutional quality 
variables on the results obtained. Specification (18) is similar to models (8) through (10), 
but includes the national average for the Law and Order index constructed by ICRG in 
the period from 1960-1995 as a proxy for institutional quality. One should note that the 
HIV coefficient and the Law and Order coefficient are not statistically significant in this 
case. The Gini coefficient survives as highly significant and initial income presents a 
positive and significant coefficient. Nevertheless, because of data availability, the sample 
size is smaller than some of the previous specifications. In addition, the RESET test 
rejects the null of no omitted variables at the 10% level (but not at the 5% level). 
Moreover, specification (19) considers a model including the voice and 
accountability index constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2006), as a proxy for institutional 
quality. One should note that in this case, neither the HIV prevalence coefficient nor the 
voice and accountability coefficient are statistically significant. Nonetheless, the Gini 
coefficient is significant, presenting the expected negative sign, and so is the coefficient 
for initial income. But, the RESET test strongly indicates that this specification might 
suffer for omitted variables bias.  
Overall, one can conclude that given the limitations in quality and availability of 
data, the conclusion obtained in the previous section that higher HIV prevalence is 
associated with lower social capital is maintained. Diagnostic statistics are not 
satisfactory for the specifications where the HIV coefficient is not significant, hence 
those results should be considered with caution. One should note that we chose to report 
only results deemed to be representative i.e. a number of additional specifications were 
estimated (by OLS and by TSLS) combining our explanatory variables in several ways, 
but the results were not substantially different from the ones reported both in terms of 
statistical significance and size of the coefficients.  
   15
Table 2 
Sensitivity Analysis  























































   0.050*** 
(0.012) 
   
Government 
effectiveness 
     0.001 
(0.026) 
       
Law & Order 
(ICRG) 

















         






         






















N  78  76 49 49 70 70 26  60  73 
R-squared  0.307  0.303 0.111 0.106 0.372 0.371 0.572  0.369  0.340 
RESET 0.012  0.078  0.412  0.746       0.099  0.000 
All regressions include a constant term (always statistically significant), which was not reported to save space. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. N denotes the number of observations included. RESET refers to p-values for 
Ramsey’s RESET misspecification test: Ho is that the model is not misspecified. c) Those specifications are Two-Stage-Least Squares (TSLS) regressions instrumented 
by circumcision rates or settler mortality as specified in the main text.   16
Conclusion 
The cross-country analysis performed in this study indicates that the notion that 
HIV/AIDS has deleterious effects on social capital at the national level has some 
empirical support. Our preferred specifications suggest elasticities of social capital to 
HIV prevalence in the order of 0.33 to 0.37. The empirical estimates predict that if one 
moves from a country with a relatively low level of HIV prevalence such as Estonia to a 
country with relatively high levels such as Uganda, one would observe an approximate 
2.5% decrease in social capital. When one performs a similar thought exercise for 
Zimbabwe (where the epidemic has reached catastrophic proportions) rather than 
Uganda, the decline in social capital would amount to over 8%.  
The estimates also suggest that measures of social distance, such as the Gini 
coefficient for income inequality, and measures of control of corruption, rule of law and 
government effectiveness are likely to be important determinants of social capital as well. 
The findings reported are subject to several caveats and are affected by problems of data 
availability, measurement error, omitted variables and limitations of econometric 
techniques. Nonetheless, the negative impact of HIV prevalence on social capital is 
reasonably robust to changes in explanatory variables, estimation methods and sample 
composition.  
The HIV/AIDS epidemic represents a significant barrier to development on a 
number of dimensions. The implications of the disease in terms of productivity, human 
capital, savings and fiscal policy among others, have been subject to significant empirical 
scrutiny. This study intended to fill a gap in terms of assessing and confirming the 
empirical importance of the impact of the disease on social capital, highlighting an 
additional channel that needs to be taken into account in the policy debate.  
This channel is particularly important if social capital is deemed to be important 
for well-being as indicated by economic theory as well as the available empirical 
evidence. Our results seem to support the validity of efforts being undertaken to address 
the potentially large social impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.   17
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Appendix A 
 
Overview of Data & Sources 
Series Description/Notes Source 
HIV prevalence  Log of (1+HIV prevalence) in 2003, alternative 
measures include most recent data from UNAIDS 
website and data from the US Census Bureau from 
1990-1998 or earliest available thereafter.  
World Bank’s World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI), 
UNAIDS, US Census 
Bureau. 
Trust   % of valid respondants answering that most persons 
can be trusted. Latest available data, but also estimates 
performed with earliest available for each country and 
averages over different survey waves. In Logs.  
World Values Survey 
Control of 
corruption 
Value of estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset by 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2006). 
Rule of law  Value of estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset by 




Value of estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset by 




Value of estimate for 1996 or earliest available.  Governance Matters 
V dataset by 




  Alesina et al. (2003). 
Linguistic 
fractionalization 
  Alesina et al. (2003). 
Gini coefficient  Average for the period 1980-1997 or earliest available 




Years of education for the population aged 25 and 
over in 1985 or earliest available thereafter. Expressed 
in Logs. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 




  Drain et al. (2006) 
and WHO (2007) 
Law and Order   Average Score 1960-1995  ICRG 
Initial income  Log of real per capita GDP in 1985, USD at PPP  Dollar and Kraay 
(2000).   20
Appendix B 
 
List of Countries Included in Regressions 
 
Albania Algeria Italy Slovakia
Argentina Ecuador Jordan Slovenia
Armenia Egypt Japan Sweden
Australia Spain Korea Turkey
Austria Estonia Lithuania El Salvador
Azerbaijan Finland Luxembourg Tanzania
Belgium France Latvia Uganda
Bangladesh UK Morocco Ukraine
Bulgaria Gerogia Moldova Uruguay
Bosnia Ghana Mexico United States
Belarus Greece Macedonia Venezuela
Brazil Croatia Malta Vietnam
Canada Hungary Nigeria Serbia/Montenegro
Switzerland Indonesia Netherlands South Africa
Chile India Norway Zimbabwe
Colombia Ireland New Zealand Portugal
Czech Rep. Iran Pakistan Romania
Germany Iceland Peru Russia
Denmark Israel Philippines Singapore
Dominican Rep. Saudi Arabia Poland  
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Appendix C 
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics 
 















Ethnic Frac.  Linguistic 
Frac. 
Initial Income  1.00                
Rule of Law  0.86 1.00               
Control of 
Corruption 
0.83 0.97  1.00             
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.86 0.97  0.95  1.00           
HIV Prevalence  -0.31 -0.17  -0.11  -0.17  1.00         
School 
Attainment 
0.65 0.60  0.58  0.59  -0.25  1.00       
Gini Coefficient  -0.24 -0.31  -0.28  -0.26  0.38  -0.43  1.00     
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-0.45 -0.47  -0.46  -0.40  0.27  -0.37  0.45  1.00   




Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max
Ethnic Frac. 80 0.356 0.228 0.002 0.930
Ling. Frac. 79 0.313 0.266 0.002 0.923
School 68 1.785 0.488 0.507 2.460
HIV 79 0.010 0.031 0.000 0.200
Trust 81 0.237 0.112 0.028 0.510
Law 80 0.442 1.021 -1.205 2.169
Corruption 80 0.377 1.050 -1.200 2.238
Government 80 0.518 1.060 -1.217 2.505
Gini 76 3.554 0.246 3.073 4.081  